We propose a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation of consumption and e¤ort in a dynamic setting with moral hazard where agents have secret access to the credit market or to storage. The recursive structure is based on a generalized …rst order approach, whose validity must be veri…ed ex-post. Thanks to the recursive formulation of the optimal contract, the veri…cation procedure turns out to be numerically parsimonious as it can be performed using standard dynamic programming techniques with only one endogenous state variable: The agent's level of assets. We study the performance of our ex-post veri…cation test in practice by solving numerically three representative in…nite horizon examples.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider an environment where risk averse individuals have random income and can borrow and lend at a given risk-free interest rate. Their asset and consumption decisions are private information. Moreover, each individual can a¤ect future income realizations through his e¤ort decision, which is also non-monitorable. The e¢ cient allocation in such setting is derived by solving the problem of a risk-neutral planner who provides incentive compatible insurance contracts based only upon income histories.
A large literature studied optimal long-term insurance contracts under moral hazard assuming that agents cannot borrow or save. 1 Rogerson (1985a) shows that preventing the agent from entering the asset market is critical -even in the presence of liquidity constraints -since in the optimal contract, the agent is actually willing to save. It can easily be shown that when the planner can perfectly control the agents'asset holdings, and can contractually restrict their acquisition of additional assets and liabilities, the e¢ cient allocation is the same as the one where the agents have no access to the credit market. In many situations, however, the planner cannot have perfect control over the agents'wealth and consumption. This is true for instance when there are hidden storage or investment opportunities. In transitional and developing countries, agents often use foreign currency, gold or some other forms of storage of value for self insurance. These forms of asset accumulation are typically not observable by the government. There are also cases where agents can have secret access to domestic or foreign accounts and credit lines. Therefore, relaxing the assumption of perfect observability and contractability on agents'asset holdings and analyzing the resulting optimal allocation is a potentially very valuable exercise from both the theoretical and applied point of view.
Introducing hidden/anonymous asset accumulation (or hidden storage) into the dynamic moral hazard model raises important methodological complications as the problem fails to have a recursive structure, at least in the usual sense. Fudenberg et al. (1990) provide characterizations of e¢ cient allocations in a wide class of dynamic environments where agents' preferences over continuation contracts are common knowledge after any history. Since the level of wealth typically a¤ects the agents' attitude toward risk, hidden borrowing and lending leads to a violation of the common knowledge of preferences assumption. 2 In spite of that, by using a generalized …rst order conditions approach, we are able to formulate the problem within the dynamic programming framework. In order to keep track of the marginal value of wealth, together with the agent's expected discounted lifetime utility, we introduce the agent's marginal utility of consumption as an additional endogenous state variable. Intuitively, the recursive formulation can be obtained because the …rst order approach allows us to write the problem in terms of equilibrium values alone. Then, incentive compatibility guarantees that common knowledge of preferences is maintained along the equilibrium path.
Virtually all existing literature justi…es the use of the …rst order approach by showing analytically that -given the optimal contract -the agent's problem is globally concave. For static moral hazard models or for dynamic models with linear taxation without moral hazard this is a perfectly viable procedure. 3 In Ábrahám and Pavoni (2007a) (AP) we also follow this route, in a two period moral hazard framework with hidden savings, and provide su¢ cient conditions for concavity of the agent's problem. Unfortunately, the derivation of (not too restrictive) analytical su¢ cient conditions for global concavity becomes di¢ cult (perhaps impossible) in a general multi-period setting such as that analyzed here. 4 In this paper, we propose to use a numerical approach, which can be easily extended to a richer class of models with incentive constraints. First, using the …rst order conditions approach, we solve the (relaxed) problem recursively. Then we take advantage of the dynamic programming formulation and develop a numerical procedure to verify ex post whether the obtained allocation is in fact incentive compatible. We allow the agent to re-maximize his lifetime utility taking the optimal (relaxed) transfer scheme as given. We then check whether the optimal value of the re-maximization problem coincides with that implied by the optimal contract.
Notice that the equality between the value of the re-maximization problem and that delivered to 2 Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and Doepke and Townsend (2006) propose a way to solve recursively an even wider class of problems than that analyzed by Fudenberg et al. (1990) . Unfortunately, their methods are not viable when hidden actions belong to a continuum as it is the case for saving decisions in our model. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001b) extend the Abreu et al. (1990) framework to a wide class of dynamic games. None of their extensions, however, is of any use for us, since our law of motion for bond holdings does not satisfy the 'full support'assumption required there. Finally, Hagedorn et al. (2007) provide a recursive formulation for a repeated moral hazard model with adverse selection problem in the …rst period. They only consider observable asset accumulation. 3 See, e.g., Rogerson (1985b) and Jewitt (1988) for the analytic …rst-order approach in the static moral hazard model; and Chang (1998) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) for a similar analytic approach in optimal linear taxation models without moral hazard. 4 According to our knowledge, there have been no previous attempts in deriving analytical conditions for the …rst order approach in discrete time dynamic moral hazard models with hidden savings. Williams (2003) proposes an interesting and tractable model in continuous time. However, the conditions for concavity based on the Hamiltonian obtained there are not satis…ed in a context where there is a linear intertemporal transfer technology such as that assumed here for savings. the agent by the optimal contract is both necessary and su¢ cient for the validity of the …rst order approach. 5 Thanks to the fact that the optimal contract takes a recursive from, the veri…cation procedure turns out to be numerically parsimonious, since the agent's re-maximization exercise requires the solution of a simple dynamic programming problem with only one endogenous state:
The agent's level of assets. The latter is an attractive property of this procedure in terms of applicability.
In order to study the e¤ectiveness of the ex post veri…cation procedure in the presence of approximation errors, we study three in…nite horizon examples. For our …rst example, Kocherlakota (2004) shows analytically that the …rst-order approach is not applicable. In this case, our numerical procedure …nds sizeable discrepancies between the optimal value of the re-maximization problem and that implied by the optimal contract. In particular, these deviations are on average two to three magnitudes higher than the numerical precision of the procedure. In other terms, the agent …nds it pro…table to deviate from the 'relaxed'optimal policy for every initial state, implying that the relaxed policies are not incentive compatible and hence the …rst-order approach is not valid.
In the second example, we rely on the closed form solution for the CARA utility case to show, analytically, that the agent's problem is concave in the constrained e¢ cient allocation. In this case, the ex post veri…cation procedure always …nds deviations well bellow numerical precision, con…rming the validity of the …rst-order approach.
The third example considers a case where from AP we know that the agent's problem is concave in the two period model, but we are unable to show it analytically for the general multiperiod case.
This example turns out to be an intermediate case. Our numerical procedure detects pro…table deviations of the agent from the relaxed optimal policy for some initial life-time utilities and …nd no such deviations for others. We found this property of the numerical approach appealing compared to the analytical approach, because in applications, we typically use particular parametrizations (usually obtained by calibration) and we restrict the initial state using some economic argument (e.g., the value of the outside option). The standard analytical approach in contrast, implicitly checks whether the agent's problem is concave for all parametrizations and for all initial states.
Our results show that the analytical approach can sometimes be more restrictive than necessary from the point of view of the considered application.
Our results also indicate that the crucial step in the numerical procedure is the approximation of the optimal policies, because for any given level of approximation, the ex post veri…cation procedure can determine whether the approximated policy is incentive compatible or not with high con…dence. However, it can happen that rough approximations of the relaxed optimal problem deliver approximated solutions which are incentive compatible, while more accurate approximations (and presumably the true solution) of the problem are not incentive compatible. Since, an accurate approximation of the optimal allocation is the main objective of any numerical procedure anyway, in this sense, the ex post veri…cation stage does not seem to pose any additional challenge in terms of numerical accuracy.
The way we use the …rst order approach together with the marginal utility of consumption as state variable resembles that adopted in the Ramsey taxation literature by Kydland and Prescott (1980) , Chang (1998) , and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) . For those models with linear taxation and no moral hazard however the …rst order approach can easily be justi…ed analytically. One key methodological contribution of this paper is to show an important complementarity between the recursive formulation and the …rst order approach which allows the formal study of dynamic incentive models where the global concavity of the agent's problem cannot be guaranteed or veri…ed analytically. In an independent work, Werning (2001 Werning ( -2002 ) develops a similar recursive formulation for the dynamic moral hazard model with hidden savings. This work is simultaneous to ours, but Werning does not formally address the issue of the validity of the …rst order approach.
Because of the methodological problems we mentioned above, the remaining few papers that analyze dynamic moral hazard with non-monitorable asset holdings use particular models and study speci…c issues. Allen (1985) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2001a) (ACK) study the e¤ect of secret asset accumulation in a hidden information moral hazard model. In Allen's framework, the agent is allowed to both borrow and lend and the set of incentive compatible contracts turns out to be a singleton: The zero-transfers contract. Cole and Kocherlakota consider an economy with hidden storage (agents can only save). They show that although the set of incentive compatible contracts is very large, whenever the return to storage is not too low the e¢ cient allocation is equivalent to a self-insurance equilibrium. In our model with action moral hazard, the constrained e¢ cient allocation does di¤er from (i.e., it is welfare improving with respect to) self insurance.
In a two period principal agent relationship, Bizer and DeMarzo (1999) show that hidden access to the credit market reduces total welfare with respect to the no asset market case. They focus on the possibility of increasing welfare by allowing the entrepreneur to default on the debt. We study the general model where default is not allowed. Bisin and Rampini (2006) study the e¤ect of bankruptcy provision, in a two period model similar to that of Bizer and DeMarzo, where agents have hidden access to insurance contracts and can default on the principal insurer as well.
In addition to no-default, we do not allow agents to secretly trade assets other than a risk free bond. Chiappori et al. (1994) Park (2004) analyze the optimal contract with discrete e¤ort. They …nd that -under some conditions -a renegotiation-proof contract always implements the minimum level of e¤ort. We consider a continuous-e¤ort model, where the planner can commit not to renegotiate the contract ex post. In our framework the optimal allocation of e¤ort is non-degenerate. Kocherlakota (2004) characterizes the optimal UI transfer scheme in a two-output moral hazard model with hidden savings, where agents'preferences are linear in e¤ort, and e¤ort a¤ects linearly job-…nding probabilities. We provide a framework to characterize the optimal contract in a general speci…cation of the model, whenever the incentive constraint can safely replaced by the …rst order conditions of the agent. Finally, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) study competitive equilibria with hidden information moral hazard and hidden asset accumulation with endogenous interest rate. They show that if only a risk-free bond is traded then the competitive allocation is generally ine¢ cient. This paper studies the constrained e¢ cient allocation (in a small open economy), where the return on assets/storage is exogenously given. Our ex post veri…cation approach can be easily extended to endogenous interest rates as far the agent takes the return on savings as given.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our environment and de…ne constrained e¢ ciency. The recursive formulation and the ex-post veri…cation procedure are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we study the numerical implementation of the recursive formulation and the veri…cation procedure. Section 5 concludes.
Environment and Constrained E¢ ciency Environment
Consider a small open economy consisting of a large number of agents that are exante identical, and who each live T 1 periods. Each agent is endowed with a private stochastic production technology which takes the following form. There is a …nite set Y = y 1 ; :::; y N of possible output levels, with y i < y i+1 : At each period t, the realization y t 2 Y is publicly observable; however, the probability distribution over Y is a¤ected by the agent's unobservable e¤ort level e, which we assume to belong to a bounded interval E = [0; e max ] : The conditional probabilities over Y are de…ned by the publicly known continuous functions 6 p i (e) = Pr y = y i j e : Hence, agents are subject to idiosyncratic risk, and we assume time independent conditional distribution of income. 7;8 Similarly to most of the dynamic moral hazard literature, we assume full support, i.e. p i (e) > 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::N and e 2 E: The history of public outcomes up to period t will be denoted by h t = (y 1 ; :::; y t ): 9 Agents are allowed to buy and sell a risk-free bond which pays a constant interest rate r 0:
Their asset holdings are private information, and we assume that each agent is born with no wealth (b 0 = 0): 10 Note that, since agents can trade only risk free bonds, asset markets are incomplete.
Therefore, we can expect that a social planner could increase overall welfare by providing additional insurance. In this setting, a constrained e¢ cient allocation can be computed by solving the problem of a benevolent planner whose aim is to reallocate resources optimally in order to insure agents, subject to the feasibility and incentive constraints which will be speci…ed below.
An allocation (or social contract) in this economy is a contingent plan
; and : = e t (h
where t (h t ) represents the transfer the individual receives in period t; e t (h t ) the implemented e¤ort, b t (h t ) the bond holdings and c t (h t ) the agent's consumption level as a function of the realized history h t . Note that we assume that agents can only be distinguished through their output histories. In this sense, since all individuals are ex ante identical, we restrict ourselves to symmetric allocations.
To simplify the analysis, we separate the planner's transfer plan, ; from ; the components of the allocation under the agent's control. The metaphor used in contract theory is that the planner proposes , and the plan will be implemented by appropriately designing the transfer scheme . 6 We assume continuity of the vector function p : E ! N ; where N = x 2 < N j x 0; P i xi = 1 : 7 For the variable y we will use, interchangeably, the terms output and income. In the …rst interpretation, we stress the fact that agents have access to a stochastic production technology. Viewing y as income, emphasizes more that agents are facing idiosyncratic risk (with an endogenous distribution). 8 Notice, that this model can be naturally extended to allow for persistence in idiosyncratic shocks by de…ning pij(e) = Pr yt+1 = y i j e; yt = y j : 9 Since the only other publicly observable variable is the planner's transfer, and the planner has full commitment, without loss of generality we can restrict public histories to be histories of income realizations alone (see Pavoni, 1999, for details).
1 0 Note that if the initial distribution of assets were not degenerate we would also face an adverse selection problem and, in period zero, the planner would propose a menu of long term contracts in order to screen agents with di¤erent b0's. We do not consider this here, however, since both agents'saving decisions and the interest rate are deterministic, there will be no role for revelation games about wealth after the …rst period.
At period t; each agent receives a transfer payment t = t (h t ) from the planner, contingent on the realized history h t . Given today's income level y t ; transfer t ; asset level b t 1 and the continuation plan n h t ; the agent chooses consumption c t 0 and bond holdings b t subject to the following budget constraint:
We impose the general condition b t h t B t h t for all h t on asset holdings, where B : =
is an exogenously given plan of borrowing constraints such that B t h t 0 for all h t , and B T h T = 0: 11;12 At the beginning of each period, the agent also decides the e¤ort level e t 2 E; which a¤ects the stochastic output realization y t+1 2 Y , leading to next period output history h t+1 = h t ; y t+1 . This sequence of events continues until period T is reached.
Agents have intertemporally additive separable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
The continuation plan W n h t = (h ); e (h ); b (h ); c (h )nh t T =t from node h t generates the following expected discounted utility at time t 1 :
where n h t = e (h )nh t T =t denotes the implemented e¤ort plan from history h t onward, E is the usual expectation operator, and 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. We assume that the choice of W is implicitly restricted in such a way that both the expectation and the (possibly in…nite) summation are well de…ned. We also assume u to be real valued and continuous; strictly increasing, strictly concave in c and decreasing in e.
To be feasible, an allocation W must be deviation-proof in all components of , that is, in e¤ort e; bond holdings b; and consumption c. Hence, we say that the allocation W is sequentially incentive compatible if, for any history h t ; we have
; e ;h t ; for all e 2 ( ; B) ;
1 1 The latter requirement is the usual condition to exclude Ponzi Games in …nite time horizon models. In the in…nite horizon version of the model (T = 1), we require B to satisfy the (equivalent) minimal condition Constrained E¢ ciency For technical tractability, we de…ne the optimal contract as the one that maximizes the planner's net returns (or minimizes costs), subject to incentive feasibility and to the social restriction that each individual must receive at least an expected discounted utility level U 0 : We will then choose U 0 so that the planner's expected discounted returns equal zero. The planner is represented by a risk neutral principal who faces the same interest rate as the agents, and whose net return at node h t induced by the continuation plan W n h t is
Given the social restriction U 0 ; the T horizon planner's problem can then be formulated as follows:
where
for some initial distribution p 0 : We postpone the issue of existence until Section 3.
Recursive Formulation and Ex-post Veri…cation
It should not be di¢ cult to see that condition (2) de…nes a complicated set of constraints: already in the two period version of the model, the number of constraints is a bidimensional continuum.
Perhaps more importantly, there is no tractable way of writing this problem recursively in its original form. Along the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Green (1987) , Abreu et al. (1990) show that when agents'preferences over continuation contracts are common knowledge after any history, the e¢ cient allocation can be characterized by using a one dimensional state variable: the agent's continuation utility. Notice that the assumption of common knowledge of preferences is not satis…ed in our framework. Essentially, the possibility of hidden asset accumulation introduces an adverse selection problem in each period since agents with di¤erent asset levels respond di¤erently to the contract. Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and Doepke and Townsend (2006) show that this adverse selection problem can be resolved by using one state variable for each agent type. According to this approach, in our framework with a continuum of possible asset levels, the number of types explodes and the relevant state becomes a function, i.e. an in…nite dimensional object. These in…nities pose obvious computational di¢ culties that make this approach infeasible in practice within our model (for a similar discussion see Phelan and Stacchetti, 2001; and Kocherlakota, 2004) .
In this section, we adopt a generalized …rst order approach which solves both aforementioned problems (the numerosity of the incentive constraints and the tractability of the recursive formulation). First we assume the validity of the …rst order approach, and present a tractable recursive formulation. Second, we take advantage of the dynamic programming framework and develop a numerical procedure to verify ex-post whether our assumption on the su¢ ciency of …rst order conditions is valid.
The First Order Conditions Approach
>From now onward, we assume that both u and p are di¤erentiable. The adoption of the …rst order approach means that the set of constraints described in (2) are replaced by the agent's corresponding …rst order conditions along the optimal path. Using the budget constraint (1) to eliminate the planner transfers t ; and assuming interiority with respect to e, 13 for any h t 6 = h T the agent's …rst order conditions become
with equality if et(h t ) > 0: Moreover, notice that when T < 1 we must impose the obvious corner solution eT (h T ) = 0.
Notice, that the asset level b t does not enter any of these constraints. This is essentially due to fact that the agent faces the same interest rate as the planner does. 14 Now, de…ne the set of social contracts satisfying these …rst order conditions as (4) and (5) :
With some abuse of notation, we will also consider contract continuations W n h s belonging to the set F OC . In these cases, the restrictions are obviously only related to histories after node h s .
The Recursive Problem
In this section, we focus on the in…nite horizon case, and in order to simplify notation, we do not report the superindex T = 1. The 'true'value function of the relaxed problem is thus de…ned as follows:
We argued above that when consumers can secretly accumulate assets, the state variable used by the standard recursive contracting literature -the agent's lifetime utility U -is no longer su¢ cient to describe the constrained e¢ cient allocation. We will see that recursivity can be recovered by complementing lifetime utility with an additional endogenous state: the marginal utility of consumption u 0 c (c; e) = x. From the Euler equation, it is clear that by a¤ecting the marginal value of wealth E [(1 + r) u 0 c (c t+1 ; e t+1 )] the planner can fully control agents' asset decisions at the margin. The adoption of u 0 c (c; e) as a state variable becomes now natural since in our framework both r and are exogenously …xed at a constant level.
Our relevant state space is hence bidimensional. 15 However, before applying the recursive techniques of Stokey et al. (1989) (SLP) to our problem, we have to consider the possibility that the feasibility correspondence can be empty for some combinations of the states. To overcome this complication, we could basically follow two alternative procedures. The …rst possibility is the use of in…nite penalizations. This option basically sets the value of the planner to minus in…nity for each combination of states (U; x) which cannot be implemented by any incentive feasible contract. 16 We choose to follow a second approach, which typically delivers a continuous value function. This second procedure is divided into two main steps. It …rst derives the state space (or domain restriction) M : the set of combinations (U; x) for which a relaxed incentive compatible contract delivering lifetime utility U , and a marginal utility x to the agent in period zero does exist.
In the second step of the procedure, the problem is solved using usual recursive techniques.
At each node h t , the (time invariant) set of relaxed incentive feasible endogenous states is formally de…ned as follows:
It is easy to see that M is non empty. 17 Given M we have the following:
Proposition 1 Given an initial distribution p 0 , and an ex-ante expect discounted utility level U 0 guaranteed to the agent, the value function V f oc solves
where V : Y M ! < is a solution to the following functional equation
e2E;c 0
Conversely, if a bounded function V de…ned on Y M satis…es the functional equation (8)- (12) and M is compact then a solution to (6) exists and
The result in the second part of the proposition implies existence of a solution to the original problem any time the …rst order approach is valid. We are able to show existence of a solution to the relaxed problem (6) as long as u is bounded with bounded derivatives (so that M is a compact set). This is so since the continuity of u and p imply that V is a continuous function. Moreover, V is weakly increasing in x and constant for all values for which constraint (12) does not bind.
Finally, from (11), the choice of low values for x i is always feasible. Hence x i can without loss of generality be chosen so that to satisfy (12) with equality.
Let us now brie ‡y turn to the domain restriction M : An argument similar to that of Abreu et al. (1990) implies that the set M can be derived by starting from a su¢ ciently large set M M ;
and computing the largest …xed point of the following operator:
e 2 E and c 0 ; (9)- (12) are satis…ed :
It turns out that F is monotone 18 and maps closed sets into closed sets. 19 Moreover, since the sequence M n = F n M is monotone, it must converge to the set
which is closed as an intersection of closed sets. It can be shown that if M is chosen su¢ ciently large, we have M 1 = M since the sequence converges to the largest …xed point of the operator F. It can be easily shown that when u is bounded with bounded …rst derivatives, M is compact. In the …nite horizon version of our model, the domain restriction sets can be similarly 1 8 That is, for any two sets M; M
. 1 9 Notice that the constraint set is formed by either equalities or weak inequalities.
computed following a backward procedure. 20 
Ex-post Veri…cation Procedure of the First Order Approach
Obviously, any interior contract W that is incentive feasible according to (2) -i.e. W 2 -is such that W 2 F OC : For the purposes of this paper, we should look at conditions under which an optimal solution W to the relaxed planner's problem (6) is such that W 2 : In that case, the solution to problem (6) satis…es incentive compatibility, hence we have actually derived the e¢ cient contract. In more detail, since F OC implies that the value V f oc is (weakly) larger than the value of problem in (3) and since the value associated to any feasible contract is obviously lower than the optimal value of the problem (among all feasible contracts), W 2 implies the claim.
A direct application of this argument is the basis of our veri…cation of the …rst order approach. After computing the optimal contract according to (6) , the procedure allows the agent to re-maximize his lifetime utility by choosing e¤ort, consumption, and bond holdings taking the optimal (relaxed) transfer scheme as given. Then we check whether the optimal decisions of this re-maximization problem coincide with those implied by the relaxed optimal contract; i.e. whether W is actually an incentive compatible allocation.
Notice that for any given transfer scheme = t (h t ) , and the sequence of borrowing constraints B the agents'incentive constraint (2) is described by the following (re)maximization prob-
where each consumer chooses contingent plans of e¤ort, consumption and bond holdings, and is the e¤ort plan implied by . The basic idea of the veri…cation procedure is to allow the agent to solve the above remaximization problem, assuming that the transfer scheme is that implicitly de…ned in 2 0 The set MT for the T horizon problem can be computed by applying the same map F we de…ned above as follows MT = F(MT 1) = F T 1 (M1); where M1 represents the set of states attainable in a one-period problem: Proposition 2 Assume M is compact and V is bounded. Let U (U 0 ) be the expected discounted lifetime utility level obtained by the agent according to (7) with p 0 degenerate at y, and be the associated transfer scheme. The …rst order condition approach is justi…ed if and only if U R 0 ( ;y) = U (U 0 ).
The proof of Proposition 2 uses the fact that the relevant deviations will always increase the agent's lifetime utility. Since it is always true that U R 0 ( ; y) U (U 0 ) ; the task of comparing two allocations is in fact greatly simpli…ed as one only need to compare two real numbers: U R 0 ( ; y) and U (U 0 ). 21 However, since is a history dependent stochastic process (i.e. an in…nite dimensional object), the veri…cation procedure seems to still require a formidable task. The key advantage of our procedure comes from the observation that the recursive formulation implies that past history can be summarized by the states U t ; x t . 22 In particular, by using the budget constraint and normalizing bond holdings to zero in each period, the disposable income coincides with the policy function for consumption:
In turn, because of the dynamic programming framework, the states evolve according to the following time invariant policy rules:
As a consequence, the re-maximization problem (15) can be written in recursive form as follows:
2 1 Consistently with our recursive approach based on continuation utilities, we disregard payo¤-equivalent deviations. 2 2 Since the problem is a repeated one, the relevant policies do not depend on yt either.
where B(U; x) is an appropriately de…ned lower bound for assets that replicates B. Therefore,
given that the policies c; f; and h (i.e. the transfer scheme ) are exogenous rules for the agent at this stage, the problem to be solved is very similar to that of self insurance, where the only endogenous state variable is the level of bonds b. According to Proposition 2, the …rst order approach is
for the states derived in the period zero maximization problem (7), with p 0 degenerate at the initial level of income y.
In the next section, we explain in detail the numerical implementation of the veri…cation procedure using three in…nite horizon examples.
Numerical Implementation
In this section, we show how to implement the procedure described above, numerically. First, we explain the three main steps (…nding the domain restriction, solving for the relaxed optimal contract and ex post veri…cation) of the procedure and then we provide some carefully chosen in…nite horizon examples. In all of the three examples, we can use previous literature to obtain conjectures about the validity of the …rst-order condition:
For expositional convenience, we describe the numerical procedure for the case where N = 2, hence Y = fy l ; y h g with y h > y l . This implies that we can de…ne the probability shifting functions as p(e) = Pr(y = y h j e) (implying that 1 p(e) = Pr(y = y l j e)). We will also assume that
(1 + r) = 1. Finally, we will restrict ourselves to cases where the Euler equation (11) and the promise keeping constraint with respect to x (12) are satis…ed with equality.
Domain Restriction
The …rst step of our numerical procedure is to compute the domain restriction M : In order to construct M , we used a modi…cation of the algorithm proposed by Chang (1998). 23 In the N = 2 case, the domain restriction set M is the set of (U; x) couples such that there exists (U l ; x l ) 2 M , (U h ; x h ) 2 M , e 2 E and c 0 such that (19)- (22) are all satis…ed:
where equations (19)- (22) are the N = 2 counterparts of equations (9) By construction, M 0 turns out to be a compact set. In order to …nd the domain restriction we need to apply the set valued operator F de…ned by (23) on M 0 iteratively until we obtain a …xed point: 24
A natural way to implement the above operator would be to replace M 0 with a two dimensional rectangular grid and iterate on (23) until convergence on this discrete set. We denote this two-
, where x j ranges between x and x and U k ranges between U and U : Note that conditions (19)-(22) impose 4 constraints on our 6 endogenous variables U l ; x l ; U h ; x h ; c; e . Since f M t 1 is a discrete set, for a given (U; x), it is not always possible to …nd (19)- (22) exactly. 25 This property is solely due to the discrete nature of the set and not due to the actual feasibility of these allocations. For this reason, we had to modify the algorithm de…ned by (23) . First, we M is convex. Following Abreu et al. (1990) one can easily show that M is convex whenever income shocks are extracted from an atomless distribution. In our model, shocks belong to a …nite support so M is in general, if not typically non-convex. 2 4 Since we generate a decreasing sequence of (nested) sets, we are allowed to search (U; x) bundles only within the set Mt 1. This speeds up the algorithm. 2 5 This is typically the case when u(c; e) is additively separable because (22) uniquely de…nes c:
as a set containing f M de…ned as follows. For a given f M and U k , we can de…ne 
and we use the following operator instead of (23) (19)- (22) are satis…ed and
The modi…ed operator selects (U; x) tuples only if there exist continuation values U i ; x i satisfying constraints (19)- (22) and they are contained in the union of closed rectangles centered on the grid points of f M t 1 with height and width given by " U and " x . The set e F( f M t 1 ) excludes (U; x) bundles for which there is no such solution of (19)- (22) that has a close enough point in the discrete set f M t 1 .
In the implementation of the procedure, we set " U k and " x j as one half of the distance between grid points implying that the 'interior'of the set is covered completely. The advantage of this approach is that no feasible point will be excluded from the interior of the set f M t due to the discrete nature of f M t 1 . However, letting (U i ; x i ) take all possible values in the rectangle around points on the frontier of f M t can lead to the inclusion of tuples which are clearly not feasible. 26 The restriction on the frontier of K( f M t 1 ) given byx min andx max , however, provides a solution for this problem.
Further, as the grid size (m and n) goes to in…nity this procedure will approximate the domain restriction arbitrarily well. Given the monotonicity properties of e F; our approximation of the domain restriction is the largest …xed point of this modi…ed operator, and it can be obtained by applying the operator until convergence starting from a su¢ ciently large grid f M 0 : 2 6 Take for example U = U , in this case, it is easy to see that the only feasible allocation is given by
, and e = 0.
Solving the Relaxed Problem by Value Function Iterations
Now we will turn to the solution of the relaxed problem described by equations (8) to (12) . We solve this problem by value function iterations, where we approximate the value function V (y; U; x) with a continuous function on the two-dimensional grid f M . Continuity is achieved by linear interpolation between grid points. More precisely, consistently with the derivation of the domain restriction, the endogenous states can take values from K( f M ). Here a few observations are worth noting.
First, this approach is compatible with the computation of the domain restriction because, there
we also had to allow U l ; x l and U h ; x h take values from the set K( f M
typically hold together and hence interpolation is necessary. Second, the domain restriction sets turned out to be without 'holes', 27 therefore interpolation within the borders is a well-de…ned procedure. Third, note that linear interpolation using the closest four neighbor in the grid f M is only straightforward in the interior of the set. Around the frontier, however, we cannot guarantee that all these neighbors are included in f M . In these cases, we use the closest three neighbors and interpolate using the perpendicular distance from these points. Finally also notice, that the value function is linear in y therefore we can recover V (y h ; U; x) = V (y l ; U; x) + y h y l .
Therefore for the practical implementation we need to solve the following dynamic programming problem
s:t: (19) (22);
where superindex refers to the -th iteration.
Also notice that if u c (c; e) is invertible in c for a given e then by …xing a particular couple e; x l we can solve analytically for the remaining 4 endogenous variables using the constraints (19)- (22) for any (U; x) 2 M . Therefore, we solve (24) by maximizing with respect to couples e; x l .
Implementing the Ex-post Veri…cation Procedure
We can now use the numerical solution of the value function and optimal policies to implement the veri…cation procedure of the …rst order condition approach described in Section 3.3. Recall, that the validity of this approach is a prerequisite of our recursive reformulation of the constrained e¢ cient problem.
We …rst obtain the optimal continuos policy rules for next period promised utility and promised marginal utility of consumption ( (16) and (17)) together with c(U; x) over the grid f M (here we again use linear interpolation in order to …nd the policy rules between grid points): Then we de…ne an interval of admissible asset levels G = [0; b] and solve (18) with value function iterations, where we use linear interpolations over f M e G, where e G is a discrete grid of q points de…ned on G.
Linear interpolations are particularly useful at this stage because polynomial interpolations are not very reliable around the borrowing limit, because polynomials do not approximate well the steep initial segment of the re-maximization value function J: Notice that by …xing the grid e G for b to the singleton f0g we could test whether the agent has incentives to deviate when he can choose only his e¤ort level, as consumption is determined by the budget constraint. 28 Speci…cally, according to (18) , we need to iterate on the following functional equation until we …nd a …xed point (superindex refers to the th iteration) :
with (U; x; b) 2 f M e G; and the …rst guess of the value function is given by
Note that the domain restriction, the solution of the relaxed problem and the solution of remaximization problem are all approximated using a similar methodology. Since, there are approximation errors, it seems that we cannot expect U R 0 ( ; y) = U (U 0 ) to hold exactly. However, assume that the …rst-order approach is actually valid in our problem. In this case, the …rst-order conditions given by (19)-(22) also characterize the solution to the ex post veri…cation problem for b = 0: Note that the allocation derived in Step 2 satis…es these conditions as well. Then, if the computation 2 8 This test, however, could never yield a violation of the …rst-order condition approach, because one can show that the agent's problem is concave in e¤ort alone under all of our parametrizations. of the optimal contract and the re-maximization problem has the same precision then, in the case where the …rst-order approach is valid, we should observe a discrepancy between U R 0 ( ; y) and U (U 0 ) which is smaller the convergence criterion for the …xed point of (25) . Hence, in this case, the approximation errors will in ‡uence only how well the value function and the optimal policies are approximated and not the ex post veri…cation procedure. Of course, when searching for the solution of (25) we need to make sure that we …nd a global optimum. This is particularly important because we know that the agent's problem may not be concave. For this reason, we use a two dimensional grid search method which guarantees that we …nd a global optimum.
In order to assess the performance of our veri…cation procedure in practice (e.g., in presence of approximation error), let's assume for simplicity 29 that n = m = q = N; that is, all grids have the same number of points. Also let's de…ne
; where the N subscripts re ‡ect that these …gures were calculated using a grid size of N and (U (U 0 ) ;
is the solution of (13): We divided the absolute deviation because of approximation errors along the procedure, we might reject models falsely where the …rst-order approach is actually veri…ed. We argued above that given our approximation procedure, this is not a likely outcome. Another potential problem arises when 0 < 2 ; that is when the …rst-order approach is not valid, but the 'true' discrepancy is very small. In this case, our approach may falsely accept the validity of the …rst-order approach. There are two main ways to face this problem. First of all, by choosing to be a small number the probability of this event can be minimized. Further, whenever N (U 0 ) , one can check whether the agent's optimal choices in the remaximization problem are di¤erent from those prescribed by the relaxed optimal problem (i.e. whetherb(U; x; 0) 0 andẽ(U; x; 0) e (U; x) whereb andẽ are the optimal asset and e¤ort choices of problem (25); and e is the optimal e¤ort choice of the relaxed problem). In our examples, in all the cases where we had N (U 0 ) , we …nd that the agent's optimal decisions were practically identical of the optimal allocation of the relaxed problem.
Examples
In this section we implement the three steps of the veri…cation procedure we described above for three di¤erent examples with varying grid sizes. Essentially, these examples are only di¤erent in the particular functional forms u(c; e) and p(e) take. Also, examples 1 and 2 are such that the validity of the …rst-order approach can be conjectured with high con…dence from previous literature or from our own derivation, respectively. Therefore they provide a nice 'testing'environment for our recursive approach with ex post veri…cation.
Example 1: The Linear-Linear Case
This example was studied by Kocherlakota (2004) who shows that the …rst-order approach is not valid in this environment. The utility function is additively separable in c and e; and both the cost function of e¤ort and the probability shifting functions are linear: 30 u(c; e) = c 1 1 e; p(e) = e.
For this speci…cation, we will follow the general procedure explained above, the only di¤erence is that because of the additive separability of the utility function, condition (22) fully determines c.
This implies that, in this case (and in Example 3 below), we can use c as a state variable instead of
x without a loss of generality. Moreover, it is easy to derive that, due to linearity, conditions (19) and (20) imply that whenever e¤ort is positive we have that
that is continuation life-time utilities are solely determined by the state (U; c) and independent of e¤ort. When the agent is required to exert zero e¤ort then U l takes the same form and any
= + is incentive compatible. This result makes the calculation of the domain restriction and the optimal (relaxed) optimal policies signi…cantly easier.
Example 2: Exponential Utility
In this case, the utility function and the probability shifting functions are taking the following functional forms:
u(c; e) = exp f (c e)g and p(e) = 1 exp f eg .
In Appendix B, we argue that, for any level of life-time utility there is only one compatible value of marginal utility of consumption. Therefore, we do not have to calculate numerically the set f M for this speci…cation. One can show that for this example, we have: u(c; e) = (1 ) U; hence c = log( U (1 )) + e; u 0 c (c; e) = u; hence x = (1 ) U ; and u 0 e (c; e) = u (c; e) ; hence u 0 e (c; e) = U (1 ):
The above results allow us to collapse several constraints, making the problem much simpler.
LetV (U; y) V (U; (1 ) U; y) ; then we have:
The above constraints imply two simple expressions for continuation utilities:
We can hence solve the above problem by maximizing the objective function only with respect to e using the above values of U h and U l .
For this speci…cation, we show analytically in Appendix B, that the …rst-order approach is valid when c and consequently U is unbounded. Obviously, because of computational feasibility we need to assume that life time utilities and consequently consumption are contained in a compact set.
Our proof cannot be directly extend to this case lacking a closed form solution, but as we will see below, our numerical procedure veri…es the …rst-order approach in this case as well.
Example 3: The "Concave" Case
In this example, the utility function is additive separable again but the cost function of e¤ort is strictly convex and the probability shifting function is strictly concave. In Ábrahám and Pavoni (2007a), we provide analytical conditions under which the agents problem is concave in the optimal contract when T = 2: It is shown there that the …rst-order approach is valid if the utility from consumption has the non-increasing absolute risk aversion property, v(e) is convex and p(e) satis…es some strong concavity condition. Unfortunately, the proof there does not generalize easily for T > 2.
In this example, we check the validity of this case for T = 1 using the ex post veri…cation procedure.
In this example, we use a probability shifting function which satisfy the strong concavity conditions on p(e) and a quadratic cost function for e¤ort:
p(e) = 1 exp f eg .
Further, since v 0 (0) = 0 while p 0 (0) = > 0; we can expect interior solutions for e¤ort.
Numerical Results
Parametrization We used parameters for all three examples such that in the full information case, where both e¤ort and asset accumulation are observable, the probability of low and high outcome is equal to 1=2. This implies that, in the absence of information problems, the three examples are observationally equivalent. This choice makes the parametrizations of the three examples comparable. Table 1 provides the parameter values we use for the simulations (recall that (1 + r) = 1). We also set the lower an upper bounds on consumptions as c = y l = 0:1 and c = y h = 100.
Ex Post Veri…cation Results
In this section, we evaluate the ex post veri…cation procedure for all the three examples for di¤erent grid sizes. For all cases, we have used the same grid for asset levels e G with q = 20 unequally spaced grid points and with upper bound on asset holdings given by b = y h . Recall, that we interpolated the ex post veri…cation value function between grid points also for asset levels. should be able to claim that the …rst-order approach is veri…ed. Let's consider …rst Example 1. For this example, the deviations are always above the tolerance level, and typically they are sizeable. In the case of our …ner grid, this is true for all initial life-time utilities. Therefore, in this case, we con…rm the analytical results and reject the validity of the …rst-order approach with high con…dence.
As expected, the results are dramatically di¤erent for Example 2. Note that both the average and maximum ex post deviations in this case are always well below . Therefore, in this case, we can be completely con…dent about the validity of the …rst-order approach. There is no particular pattern how the magnitude of the deviations varies with grid size but it should not be surprising, since all these values are at least a magnitude below the convergence criterion and hence we cannot di¤erentiate any of them from zero. Finally, recall that in Appendix B, we show the validity of the …rst-order approach analytically for the case when consumption and life-time utility is unbounded.
The results in this table indicate that the fact that we made life-time utility and consumption bounded for computational reasons, does not in ‡uence the validity of the …rst-order approach in this case.
We believe that the above results have a general message: when the …rst-order approach is valid approximation errors play smaller role at the ex post veri…cation stage. As we explained in Section 4.3, if a given approximate solution to the relaxed problem (24) is incentive compatible, then conditions (20)- (21) provide su¢ cient characterization of the ex post veri…cation problem. Since, these conditions are satis…ed exactly (subject to rounding errors) when we calculate the optimal policies and we use the same degree of approximation in both procedures, we should not expect to see any signi…cant deviations. The approximation of the ex post veri…cation value function J over asset levels plays only a small role here, because if the allocation is actually incentive compatible (due to our normalization) the agent will uniformly choose zero assets along the whole equilibrium path.
Figure 1 Here
If we consider Example 3, we obtain a more complex picture. First of all, Figure 1 shows for N = 100 that for certain initial life-time utilities the ex post veri…cation procedure detects small deviations (below the tolerance level) while for some other initial utilities it detects deviations which are above the tolerance (from Table 2 , we know that the maximum is 0:12 which is about 4:3% in relative terms). 31 This result is in contrast with Example 1, where we …nd sizeable deviations everywhere over the whole state space (even the minimum deviation is a magnitude above the tolerance level). This result implies that we cannot justify the …rst-order approach globally for Example 3. 32 >From a practical point of view, these results have the following interesting implication. In applications, we typically interested in some particular parametrization (usually obtained by calibration) and we can pin down initial life-time utilities by using some economic considerations (e.g. the outside option of the agent or by a zero surplus condition on the planner/principal). In this sense, analytical (global) su¢ cient conditions can be unnecessarily restrictive for any particular application. For example, in our example, if we take the value of autarky (self-insurance) as the initial utility (U 0 = 12:3), then we …nd deviations below the tolerance level, while if we take the initial life-time utility which makes the planner's surplus equal to zero (U 0 = 3:05) the discrepancies are quite large (see, Figure 1 ). Therefore whether we have found the true constrained e¢ cient allocation seems to depend on which initialization makes sense in the particular application.
However, one has to be cautious with this case, because some extra checks might be necessary.
First, the agent may not …nd it pro…table to deviate in an initial state U 0 , but there might be future contingencies ((U; x) tuples) with positive probability originating from this node where she would deviate from the relaxed optimal contract. If these probabilities are relatively small compared to the gains in those contingencies, we might have that N (U 0 ) :
This does not contradict the fact that the requirement for the validity of the …rst order approach is only the (period zero) condition U R ( ; y) = U (U 0 ). 33 When we …nd that N (U 0 ) is only valid for a subset of the domain, one might however say that the …rst-order approach is justi…ed only in a weak sense. In order to verify the …rst order approach in a stronger sense, one needs to show that there is no future node which can be reached with positive probability, such that the agent has positive utility gains for deviating. When we checked this for Example 3 (N = 100) 34 , we found that when N (U 0 ) ; for some U 0 ; the agent indeed …nds it pro…table to deviate in some future contingencies which occur with low probability, while for other initial states it was not the case. Note that this latter result does not mean that there are some levels of life-time utility
which cannot be reached from some initial U 0 . It rather implies that the combinations of life time utility and marginal utility of consumption such that the agent has positive gains from deviating from the relaxed optimal plan are not reached by the agent with positive probability starting from this initial life-time utility level. Controlling for the absence of pro…table deviations for all possible continuation histories is a procedure computationally very demanding, implying the possibility of further numerical errors. In contrast, when N (U; x) := J(U; x; 0) N U holds for the whole domain (U; x) 2 f M as in Example 2, we can always verify the validity of the …rst-order approach in a stronger sense.
Figure 2 Here
A second property of the ex post veri…cation approach seems to be less attractive. In the case of Example 3, whenever we use rougher grid size we always …nd smaller deviations for a given U 0 .
This is apparent when we compare Figure 1 to Figure 2 where we plot absolute ex post deviations for Examples 1 and 3 for N = 50. Moreover, for the rougher grid, the magnitude of these deviations can be actually below the tolerance level. This is particularly important for Example 3, where, for most utility levels, the deviations are below the tolerance level and for the points between 3 and 3 3 As it is shown in Proposition 2, theoretically, sequential incentive compatibility and period zero incentive compatibility coincide. However, in the presence of numerical errors, this is not necessarily the case. We can have that U R ( ; y) U (U0) " and, at the same time at future nodes with small probability, the discrepancy between U R t ( ; y) U t U0; h t is large, and, in particular, it is well above ". 3 4 For computational tractability, we checked this at all the nodes only up to 10 periods into the future.
2, where the deviations are signi…cant, they are hardly visible (see in Table 2 that the maximum is 0:0026). In the case of Example 1, this happens only for high lifetime utilities. 35 This implies that for the rougher grid size, we can …nd an approximation of the relaxed optimal allocation which is actually incentive feasible for a given U 0 . However, when we increase the precision of the approximation of the relaxed problem, we detect some positive deviations for the same U 0 . In other words, rougher grids may deliver solutions of the relaxed problem which allow for smaller or no deviations of the agent. It hence seems to be key to …nd as good approximation of the relaxed problem as possible. Then, the design of the ex post veri…cation procedure is going to tell us whether the given approximate solution of the relaxed problem is incentive compatible or not with high con…dence. However, the best possible approximation of the optimal allocation is always desirable, because typically the optimal policies are the main object of investigation. In this sense, the ex post veri…cation procedure does not impose any additional requirement on the precision of the approximation. Importantly, when we can be reasonably certain that we found a precise enough approximation of the (relaxed) optimal policies, our results suggest that we can be also reasonably certain that the ex post veri…cation will give us the right answer about the incentive compatibility of this allocation.
Finally, this example highlights the fact that the time horizon of a problem can be also important for the applicability of the …rst-order approach. AP show analytically that for T = 2 the agent's problem is concave in the optimal allocation with the speci…cation of Example 3. Here we have learnt that this result does not generally extend to the in…nite horizon case.
Conclusions
Relaxing the assumption of perfect observability and contractability on agents'asset holdings in the dynamic moral hazard model is a potentially very valuable exercise from both the theoretical and applied point of view. However, the introduction of hidden assets introduces serious methodological complications. In this paper we propose a way of solving the methodological problems.
We show that, by using a generalized …rst order condition approach, the model can be solved within the recursive contracts framework where, together with the promised lifetime utility, we used the agent's marginal utility of consumption as an additional endogenous state variable. The recursive formulation also permits a parsimonious numerical ex-post veri…cation procedure of the …rst order approach. We study the performance of our veri…cation procedure in practice by solving three in…nite horizon examples numerically. We …nd that the procedure never rejects models that should be trusted while for too coarse grids it might fail to detect the lack of incentive compatibility of the 'true'relaxed optimal contract.
The general model and methodology studied in this paper can be applied to study the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of optimal policies such as unemployment insurance and welfare programs. In an extended version of this paper (Ábrahám and Pavoni, 2006) , we study some of the main qualitative properties of the e¢ cient allocation. We …nd that hidden asset accumulation changes dramatically the intertemporal properties of the key variables. We focus on the case with additive separable preferences in c and e. The optimal allocation under hidden savings displays (on average) increasing consumption and lifetime utility, key properties of the self insurance allocation. This leads to an intertemporal path of e¤ort (production) and asset holdings that are also strikingly di¤erent from standard moral hazard models (with observable assets). The intertemporal discrepancies with respect to self insurance are also important but essentially of quantitative nature. The source of the main discrepancy is consumption smoothing. By decreasing the level of idiosyncratic uncertainty the agent faces, the planner reduces the precautionary motive for savings, and makes the intertemporal path of consumption ‡atter than that in self insurance. This implies a relatively ‡at intertemporal path of e¤ort and asset holdings as well. In this sense, the forces operating in the hidden asset moral hazard economy place the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption and e¤ort in-between self insurance and pure moral hazard.
The framework we develop in this paper can be fruitfully used to study the optimal (private) contract in several other moral hazard problems where hidden savings may be relevant (e.g., longterm employment and compensation contracts, corporate loans and managerial contracts), in a systematic way. More generally, the ex post veri…cation procedure we propose in this paper could be easily applied to a richer set of models. For example, in the recursive formulation of Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and Doepke and Townsend (2006) , the set of incentive compatibility constraints easily becomes very large. The computational burden could be reduced signi…cantly by imposing only a carefully chosen (and economically guided) subset of the constraints, and verify ex post whether the obtained e¢ cient allocation is in fact incentive compatible. Another application could be to Ramsey optimal taxation models, when it is di¢ cult to guarantee global concavity of the household's program. 36 In this case, our ex post veri…cation procedure would be equivalent to solving the relevant competitive equilibrium taking the tax rate processes as given.
with the domain restriction implies that e¤ort incentive compatibility (4) is satis…ed at each node. In order to show that (11) implies that the saving incentive compatibility is satis…ed we need to show that (29) and (31) which is just (5). By the above argument, problem (6) can be equivalently written as
It is now a straightforward application of the Bellman principle to show that the true value of the problem V f oc can be decomposed as follows:
where, for x i ; U i 2 M and y i 2 Y; we have
The proof of this last statement requires to verify for the last problem the properties for the sup operator which de…nes the original function V f oc (U 0 ): To show that it is an upper bound notice that since any pair W; S 2 M such that
) for all such pairs. We now want to show that it is the least upper bound. Take any "=2 > 0: By the de…ni-tion of sup in (33) there exists a set of pairs x i ; U i 2 M i = 1; 2; :::N such that
Moreover, for any i and x i ; U i 2 M there exists a pair W; S n y i 2 M such that U 1 (y i ) = U i ; x 1 (y i ) = x i and W f oc (y i ; x i ; U i ) < 1 ( W; y i ) + "=2. All this implies that for any " > 0 there exists W; S 2 M such that
Following a line of proof similar to that we used above and using again standard arguments (e.g., using a direct application of Theorem 4.2 of SLP) it is easy to show that the 'interim'value function W f oc solves the functional equation (8)- (12) . The key is to realize that the restriction M can be equivalently written recursively by using the following state dependent correspondence
: c 0; e 2 E; U i ; x i 2 M for all i (9)- (10)- (11)- (12) o which is straightforward to verify directly from the de…nition of M .
The converse is standard. When V is bounded we can use Theorem 4.3 of SLP to show that V = W f oc .
In this case, since M is compact, we can apply Theorem 4.6 of SLP and prove that V is continuous. Notice that we can use the theorem of the maximum (e.g. see Theorem 3.6 in SLP) despite that the restriction on c 0 is unbounded above. This is so since the objective function is coercive in c and this allow us to restrict the choice of c to compact sets only. 37 The maximum theorem hence guarantees that the policy correspondence is non empty for any (y; x; U ) 2 Y M , and existence of an optimal plan can be shown by repeatedly applying (any selection of) the policy. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the case where p 0 is degenerate at y; and let U 0 the utility to be delivered to the agent in period zero. We denote by W f oc (U 0 ) the relaxed optimal contract (which exists by Proposition 1), and by V (U 0 ; y) the value of the true optimal (fully incentive compatible) contract associated to problem (3) . In terms of the proposition,
there exists a feasible deviation hence W f oc (U 0 ) cannot be optimal since it is not incentive feasible, i.e. W f oc (U 0 ) = 2 .
To show the converse, notice …rst that -since
Moreover, since obeying to the proposed contract is feasible for the agent we always have
implies that W f oc (U 0 ) 2 ; i.e. it is sequentially incentive compatible. 3 7 Since V is bounded we have coercivity: lim c!1 f (c) = y c + 1 1+r P p i (e)V y i ; U i ; x i = 1: Coercivity and continuity guarantee that the objective function f has compact upper sections:
and we can without loss of generality focus on the compact sets U ( ) for c:
If at node h t ; W f oc (U 0 ) is not incentive compatible, there must be a feasible deviation strategy such that U T t f oc ; ;h t > U T t f oc ; f oc ; h t : Suppose that we construct a new plan f oc for the agent as follows. Assume the agent behaves as suggested by the contract both before period t and after period t in all nodes but h t ; while at node h t he follows plan . This plan is clearly available to him in the remaximization problem. It must hence be that U R 0 ( ; y) U T 1 f oc ; f oc ;y > U (U 0 ) where the last inequality is due to the assumption that > 0 and the full support assumption, which implies that h t is reached with positive probability. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: The Exponential Utility Example
Closed form for the planner' s problem Consider problem (8)- (12) , with N = 2 and T = 1;
where the utility function and the probability of the high state are as follows:
u(c; e) = exp f (c e)g and p h (e) = p(e) = 1 exp f eg ; > 0:
We will furthermore assume that the discount factor is not too low, that is In what follows we will show that: When facing the optimal contract in the re-maximization stage, the agent optimally decides to follow the planner original recommendations. In other terms, for this speci…cation of the model we are entitled to use the …rst order approach when solving for the optimal contract.
The proof of the claim will be done in several steps. First, we will be able to derive a recursive closed form for the planner's problem. This will provide us with an analytical expression for the optimal policy, which will in turn allow us to obtain a closed form for the agent's re-maximization problem as well. The analytical expression for the agent's re-maximization problem will take a recursive form along the lines of our J function in Section 4.3.
Several things are peculiar of this parametric formulation of the problem. First, we can allow c to become negative. 38 Second, u 0 c (c; e) = u 0 e (c; e) = u(c; e) = exp f (c e)g : The Euler equation (for (1 + r) = 1) together with the law of iterated expectations imply x t = u 0 c (c t ; e t ) = E t [u 0 c (c t+k ; e t+k )] 8k 1. The life-time utility of the agent is then given by
history. It is easy to see that such plan is incentive compatible. In order to obtain note that
Hence is de…ned by the following relationship:
That is exp f g = U and therefore = log( U ) > 0. This implies that the cost of this perturbation for the planner is
Now, if we use the same argument to reach utility level U 0 = 1 from an initial U < 1; we have from (36) thatV
Since U was chosen arbitrarily, both (36) and the above inequalities are true for all U: Combining the two expressions we have the desired expression
Interestingly, the function is very similar to that obtained in the literature for the moral hazard model with no access to the credit market (e.g., Green, 1987 By using the properties of the logarithm it is easy to see that the planner objective function is additive separable in U on the one hand, and i i = 1; :::N and e are independent of U on the other hand. This implies that the whole constrained maximization, hence its solution, does not depend on U . 43 We can …nally
show that the constant A (y) is implicitly de…ned by A (y) =V ( 1; y) = y e + ln (1 ) + A + 1 1
where A = P i p i (e )A y i ; and (with some abuse of notation) we use i for their optimal values. For the optimal value of e¤ort, we use e , and we assume that the parameters of the model (in particular the levels of income) are such that e > 0:
The Agent' s Re-Maximization Problem: A Closed Form Consider now the problem faced by the agent in the ex-post re-maximization stage. We will show that at this stage the agent's unique optimal decision is to follow the planner recommendations on e¤ort and asset holdings. We will use a recursive approach, which is the analytical analogous to our veri…cation procedure of Section 3.3. The guess for the agent's value function when facing the optimal contract is (recall that 1 1+r = ) :
where b is the level of assets and U is the lifetime utility according to the optimal contract. Note that -as we expect -for b = 0 we have J (U; 0) = U . To verify our guess, notice that plugging in our policies for the optimal contract we derived above, the value function solves J (U; b) = max were c (U ) is the net transfer the agent receives from the planner when the history of shocks implies state U . First of all, we need to verify that our guess for J is correct. We will do it by using as candidate policies the solution to the …rst order conditions with respect to b 0 and e of the agent's problem. We will then show that the agent's problem is globally concave so that the choices for e and b 0 are the (unique) optimal ones for the agent. 
The …rst order condition with respect to e is as follows exp f c (U ) + eg exp
We now show that the optimal e¤ort recommendation of the planner for e and b 0 = b are solving the above conditions, when the agent faces the optimal contract. 44 Since the planner recommendation in the optimal contract is e t e and b t 0 we will be done since the agent starts with zero assets in period zero.
If we use ( 0 ) : P i p i (e ) i = 1 and the exp f c (U ) + e g = (1 ) U condition (37) evaluated 4 4 The intuition for this result is as follows. The absence of wealth e¤ects implies that for any level of assets b; the agent will supply exactly the same level of e¤ort and will consume the annuity of her …nancial wealth (1 ) b; hence keeping b constant. This additional consumption will increase the agent's utility by exp f (1 ) bg every period in addition to the average utility delivered by the contract given by (1 ) U in each period. where we used again the fact exp f c (U ) + e g = (1 ) U; and condition ( 0 ):
This condition is not surprisingly the same as the …rst order condition for b 0 : It is now easy to verify, by plugging our optimal solutions into the Bellman equation which de…nes J; that our guess is correct.
Finally, one can use known veri…cation theorems to show that J is the true value function for the agent problem.
45
Recall that we are entitled to use the …rst order conditions to derive the policy functions only when the maximization problem de…ning the Bellman functional equation is concave. What is hence left to demonstrate is the concavity of the agent's problem for all U and b. Global concavity entitles us to obtain the optimal policies for the agent's problem by only looking at …rst order conditions. Since we have shown that the planner recommendations are solving the agent's …rst order conditions in the re-maximization problem, global concavity will imply that the use of the …rst order conditions of the agent in place of the incentive constraint in the planner's problem of the previous section was actually justi…ed as the planner's recommendations according to the relaxed problem are optimal for the agent when facing the optimal (relaxed) contract. Notice that we can write exp f c (U ) + eg = (1 ) U exp fe e g ;
so Q (e; b 0 ; b) becomes 2 (1 ) U exp fe e g exp f b b 0 g+ (1 ) 2 U exp f (1 ) b 0 g P i p i (e) i < 0: The last inequality is obtained from the observations that U < 0 and i 0; and the non-negativity of the exponential function. Now, since the problem is smooth, both cross derivatives can be obtained -for example -by taking the derivative of (37) with respect to e. We hence have where we have used (39) to show the equality in the second line.
Finally from (38) , the second order condition with respect to e is as follows where we have again used (39). Recall that from the incentive compatibility, for our parametrized model with two income levels we obtain l > h , we have for all e 
Since U < 0 the last conditions implies P i p 00 i (e) i > 0, hence L(e; b 0 ; b) < 0 for all e; b; and b 0 . We have a 2 2 Hessian matrix. Recall that a su¢ cient condition for a 2 2 symmetric matrix to be negative de…nite is that it has positive determinant and a negative trace. Since both elements of the trace are negative we only need to show that the Hessian has a positive determinant. The determinant for H is: Using now (40), we have P i p i (e) i > X; so, since + 2 X > 0 we have
It is now easy to see that since 2 (0; 1) and ; X > 0, we have 
